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Abstract 
As aid interventions by nature are temporary, they will eventually be withdrawn. Reasons and circumstances of 
withdrawals vary since withdrawals can be part of a strategic approach to long-term sustainability, a change in 
organizational priorities, or a political decision made at a higher level. A growing international demand for effective and 
sustainable outcomes of aid programs emphasizes a proper exit and exit strategy. However, a successful exit takes a 
well-planned strategy at early stages of aid programs and significant amounts of resources. This study reviews 
approaches to exit and exit strategies at a program level, and common elements of a viable exit strategy including 
setting an exit timeline, establishing specific criteria and indicators, identifying key actors, and building a monitoring 
and evaluation system. These elements need to be guided by transparency, inclusion, predictability, obligation, and 
flexibility.   
Keywords: exit strategy, sustainable exit, sustainability, international aid, intervention program  
1. Introduction 
Aid by nature is temporary (Jerve & Slob, 2008). Accordingly, intervention aid will be eventually withdrawn for a variety 
of reasons and circumstances. A withdrawal can be part of a strategic approach to long-term sustainability, a change in 
organizational priorities, or a political decision made at a higher level (Lewis, 2016; Oswald & Ruedin, 2012). For a 
general timeline to withdraw program activities, a funding cycle decides it, and in many cases, a program exits at the end 
of the funding cycle (Rogers, 2004). Yet, a funding cycle does not necessarily coincide with the time required to achieve 
program goals. A donor’s fiscal year and other predetermined conditions for a program can impose an asynchronous 
timeline between an actual program exit and achievement of program goals (Gardner, Greenblott, & Joubert, 2005). 
Exit in intervention programs refers to the withdrawal of externally provided program resources that include material 
goods, human resources, and technical assistance from the entire program area (Rogers, 2004). Exit is technically hard to 
do well because it cannot be manufactured or imposed under a tight control, and needs to be done in a contextually 
specific way (Lewis, 2016). Also, a program tends to evolve over a funding cycle as situations change. A program’s 
evolution often necessitates modifications of program activities while different program elements require different 
approaches to exit for sustainable outcomes (Rogers, 2004). Thus, a successful exit is considered rather an exception than 
a rule (Oswald & Ruedin, 2012). 
With growing global demands for aid effectiveness and sustainability, a proper exit with strategic approaches has been 
emphasized. A basic premise behind strategic approaches to exit is to encourage effective and sustainable program 
outcomes (Gardner et al., 2005). Despite the increasing demand and significance of a proper exit, one of the most 
commonly practiced exits is a simple withdrawal from the ongoing supports at the end of the contract period. Moreover, a 
constant flow of new programs being implemented tends to overshadow the issue of exit and management guidelines that 
should, in theory, be sensitive to different contexts, and protect values of a donor and recipient as well as sustaining 
benefits (Rönngren, 2011).  
An exit strategy can be viewed as a tool to plan and structure the implementation of exit, typically a withdrawal of 
financial resources from a specific program, country or region (Lewis, 2016). The goal of an exit strategy is to ensure that 
program outcomes and benefits are sustained after a program exits, and that the benefits are not compromised by the fact 
or means of exit (Rogers, 2004; World Food Programme, 2005). The existing literature on exit strategies recommends 
some general principles for good practice, such as planning for exit from the outset of a program, consulting and 
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communicating with stakeholders at a regular basis, and considering sustainability early on (Lewis, 2016). However, most 
discussions of exit strategies begin with the question of what triggers exit of a donor’s involvement. Some of those 
triggers are political pressure generally from the donor’s side, an unexpected decrease in donor resources, or ideally no 
need for further aid (Levinger & McLeod, 2002).  
For a country-level exit decision, political motivations play a major role. For instance, a study that evaluated 14 
country-level exit cases showed all the exit decisions were politically motivated, all but one were donor-initiated, and no 
case assessed sustainability of supported activities before an exit decision was made (Rönngren, 2011). It might not come 
as a surprise since aid forms part of political relations with donors’ policy agendas (Heldgaar, 2008). Accordingly, aid 
policies tend to be coupled with and instrumentalized for a foreign policy (Jerve & Slob, 2008). Therefore, understanding 
a political motivation for a donor’s exit is important as it influences how the exit is handled. Some common political 
motivations are; first and ideally, the recipient country can manage program outcomes without donor aid; the recipient is 
disqualified due to the perceived violation of good governance standards; the recipient is accused of aid mismanagement; 
and the donor’s criteria for selecting a recipient country are revised (Jerve & Slob, 2008). A unilateral exit decision made 
by a donor may not involve a timely assessment and plan for sustainability of the supported activities, and a recipient 
country could exert little control over the exit and process. A study debates that when a recipient country perceives a 
program being imposed by a donor and feels excluded during the process, the recipient country less likely supports for 
sustained program outcomes (Lee, 2016). In rare cases, a recipient country may direct an exit when; an aid program is 
perceived as interference of domestic affairs; it seeks to enhance its international image by reducing aid; or it needs to 
decrease a burden of aid coordination (Jerve & Slob, 2008). Furthermore, donor countries rarely explore possibilities of 
other donors taking over their programs. This situation unlikely ensures sustainability of program outcomes particularly 
when a recipient country itself lacks necessary resources or capacity to take them over (Oswald & Ruedin, 2012).  
At a program level, a program design should include exit strategies, guided by rules from the program outset. This does 
not seem to be the reality. Instead, organizations tend to develop rules, and design an exit once the exit decision is made 
(Lewis, 2016). This can result in retrofitting exit rules and strategies. In some cases, an implementing agency 
retrospectively learns from its experience with difficult exit, and develops strategies that are to be integrated in similar 
future programs. At the same time, it is often practically difficult to have exit strategies in place at the beginning of a 
program. Circumstances change, contexts differ, and program elements may require a degree of modification during the 
program implementation. Despite the challenges, exit strategies should be built into a program design and consider how 
the exit needs to happen under what rules as a roadmap towards sustainable program outcomes (Lewis, 2016).  
Ideally, an exit strategy, timeline, criteria, and a monitoring system should be coherently drafted at the program outset, and 
pre-planned exit activities be implemented along the program (Gardner et al., 2005). Those coherent activities can 
promote stakeholders’ capacity building and program ownership to better sustain benefits. With significance  of exit and 
exit strategy for aid effectiveness and sustainability in mind, this study reviews approaches to exit and some common 
elements of a viable exit strategy, and intends to draw suggestions for playing out an exit plan in practice.  
2. Approaches to an Exit Strategy  
An exit strategy is a specific plan describing how the program intends to withdraw from a region while ensuring that the 
achievement of the development goals is not jeopardized, and that further progress toward these goals is made (Rogers, 
2004). Or more simply, it can be a tool to plan and structure the implementation of an exit, typically the withdrawal of 
financial resources from a specific program, country or region (Lewis, 2016). An exit strategy should include exit 
indicators, monitoring systems for measuring progress to exit, and identification of capacities to be built when donor 
assistance ends (World Food Programme, 2005). 
A study by Levinger and McLeod (2002) describes an exit strategy with three approaches; a phase-down, phase-over and 
phase-out (Levinger & McLeod, 2002). With a phase-down, program activities are reduced whereas with a phase-over, a 
program or part of it is transferred to a different organization. A phase-out withdraws a donor’s involvement without 
turning the program over to another organization. In some cases, these approaches take place in a sequential manner; the 
phase-down is followed by the phase-over or phase-out, and the phase-over by the phase-out. Yet, implementing one of 
the approaches is mainly based on organizational and programmatic objectives. The phase-down may aim at enabling a 
donor to become more strategic with its scarce resources while readying local stakeholders to become more capable of 
sustaining program outcomes. In fact, the phase-down needs to ensure that reduction in inputs and activities should not 
correspond to reduction in program benefits. The phase-over aims at continuing vital services or activities under a new 
management (Levinger & McLeod, 2002). Accordingly, it emphasizes institutional capacity in a taking-over organization 
for continued program outcomes (Gardner et al., 2005). The phase-out targets on achieving a constant benefit flow 
without external inputs, and the best outcome after the phase-out is self-sufficiency while the worst is loss of benefits 
gained during the intervention after the phase-out (Levinger & McLeod, 2002).  
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Besides organizational and programmatic objectives, the nature of a program largely determines how an exit is 
operationalized (Levinger & McLeod, 2002). As a general rule, programs that require continued provision of resources 
and supervision suggest the phase-over approach. Otherwise, programs may choose the phase-out approach (Rogers, 
2004). In some cases, the phase-over and phase-out are not very different or mutually exclusive (Lewis, 2016). Even 
though a donor phases out its support, some of the key components are phased over to local stakeholders or o ther 
organizations during or as a transition period. Therefore this blurs the line between the phase-over and phase-out.  
For the phase-over, a local community or permanent high-level institution may take over program activities (Rogers, 
2004). First with a local community’s take-over, the success depends on a community’s management capacity, mastery of 
necessary technical skills, and ability to obtain or generate resources required for continuing relevant activities. These 
three criteria need to be met for a fully functional community organization to sustain program outcomes. Clear indicators 
are often necessary to determine a current level of community’s technical and institutional capacity, and demonstrate 
changes in capacity when a program exit nears. Thus the indicators help assess the readiness of the community 
organization to take over key program activities, and should be part of the phase-over strategy. When provision of 
resources are crucial to sustain program outcomes, community organizations might require legal empowerment, for 
instance, to charge user fees or receive government subsidies. Secondly, a take-over by a permanent high-level institution 
intends to integrate a program into the existing government support system. Governmental commitment to maintaining a 
program seems ideal when continued resource, staff, or infrastructure inputs are crucial. Such integration becomes 
particularly important when charging user fees for cost recovery is not feasible for legal, cultural, or economic reasons, 
and external funding is scarce. This approach assumes that the government is able to support activities to achieve program 
goals. But many developing countries lack necessary resources or political will to mobilize available resources. The 
decision on which type of the phase-over should be adopted needs to be based on a careful analysis of power dynamics, 
available resources, technical and managerial capacity, cultural values and other relevant institutions as they widely vary 
across communities and government agencies. In general, the best outcomes are expected when the central government 
provides resources and legal authorization for program activities whereas the local community assumes responsibilities 
for their implementation (Rogers, 2004).  
If program outcomes can self-sustain, exit strategies may not seem necessary. Some of the self-sustaining outcomes occur 
with infrastructure constructions or behavior changes (Rogers, 2004). Seemingly permanent though, infrastructure 
construction is likely to require maintenance over time. Without resource provision and a mechanism for maintenance, the 
infrastructure would probably deteriorate. In this case, the phase-over allows key stakeholders to be responsible for 
maintenance of the infrastructure to sustain it. Behavior changes that a program intends to bring about are likely to 
self-sustain if the benefits associated to the behavior changes are well perceived. An example is improved agricultural 
production practices that farmers adopt because they appreciate the advantageous practices (Rogers, 2004). Yet there is a 
subtle difference between their application and adoption of agricultural practices. The application indicates the practice is 
used at least over one farming season while the adoption in a sustainable way over an extended period of time (Nelson & 
Swindale, 2013). When program outcomes are implementable and beneficial to adopters, the outcomes are likely 
self-sustaining (Rogers, 2004).  
However, a challenge arises when the program goal is, in fact, to expand or scale up the beneficial changes after the 
program exits. A key to a program’s scalability as well as sustainability is both technical competency and an institutional 
system in place (Oswald & Ruedin, 2012). Local stakeholders may take up the technical hardware part, but the 
institutional software part especially for enabling environment is often beyond the scope of a program exit plan.  
3. Principles and Elements of an Exit Strategy  
Across contexts and motivations of an exit, overarching exit principles are suggested; transparency, inclusion, 
predictability, obligation (Oswald & Ruedin, 2012), and flexibility. The OECD study includes sustainability as one of its 
five principles (Oswald & Ruedin, 2012), yet instead flexibility is included in the current study. The reason is that 
sustainability is a goal of an exit strategy rather than a principle in this context. The five principles are explained in Table 
1. Individually or collectively, they could be used as guidance for elements of an exit strategy that are discussed in a later 
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Table 1. Five principles of an exit with a detailed meaning and guiding actions for each principle, adopted and modified 
from Oswald & Ruedin, (2012) 
Principle Detail of principle  Action 
Transparency 
- Plan exit based on transparent communication 
about relevant activities  
- Ensure all stakeholders informed of when, why 
and how exit occurs 
- Coordinate and utilize open communication channels to 
inform/explain reasons, methods and timelines for exit with 
clarify 
Inclusion 
- Include stakeholders in discussions on exit 
process 
- Define stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities clearly with 
their participation  
- Set up meetings at a regular basis and include all or key 
stakeholders to discuss exit strategies 
Predictability 
- Use program outcomes and impact for making 
justifiable decisions about exit 
- Set up sessions with key stakeholders for their 
understanding of outcome measures and impact assessment  
Flexibility 
- Include room to modify and adjust exit plans 
and activities 
- Stay flexible in case of sudden changes in 
program components and funding 
- Set up regular meetings for voices of stakeholders heard 
and reflected 
- Obtain agreement with stakeholders on plan modifications 
and rationale behind them 
Obligation 
- Identify and manage risks and opportunities 
associated with exit for local stakeholders 
- Analyze risks and opportunities associated with exit for 
stakeholders, and draft potential solutions to risks 
- Acknowledge emotional aspects of possible stakeholder 
deprivation by exit  
The five principles can be an overarching guidance for formulating an actual exit strategy and coherent activities. Existing 
literature and exit guidance have identified several elements of a viable exit strategy. Among them are setting an exit 
timeline, establishing specific criteria, benchmarks, and action steps for exit, identifying key actors, and building a 
monitoring and evaluation system. They appear the most relevant, thus are discussed individually. 
3.1 Setting an Exit Timeline  
In theory, donors should not exit until the program benefits can be sustained, but in reality an exit rarely takes place with 
ensured sustainability of benefits due to financial or institutional constraints for formulating and implementing a solid exit 
plan (Levinger & McLeod, 2002). Planning for exit is a sophisticated process that includes development of a set of an exit 
strategy, criteria and their benchmarks, and a monitoring system. Those exit activities need to be continuously reassessed 
in the context of changing circumstances (Gardner et al., 2005). Thus, they should be planned at the earliest stages of a 
program design to secure a lead time for modification, consensus and resources required. 
From the beginning of a program, all stakeholders, especially local stakeholders, should firmly acknowledge that exit will 
happen. This recognition likely eliminates a sense of dependence on the program and resentment against the exit. More 
importantly, it stimulates stakeholders to become self-reliant by strengthening their technical and institutional capacity. A 
greater sense of local ownership can be expected as local stakeholders are part of an exit planning (Rogers, 2004). Another 
advantage of setting a timeline at early stages is that it provides sufficient lead time to devise means for generating necessary 
resources, and plan a staff-transfer to other relevant programs after the exit (Gardner et al., 2005). The staff aware of the exit 
timeline may better align themselves to implement the exit activities effectively and efficiently (Lewis, 2016). Therefore, 
setting an exit timeline as early makes it less likely that a program withdraws without proper preparation or simply rolls over 
from cycle to cycle (Levinger & McLeod, 2002). Duration of a program determines an exit timeline as well. With a one-year 
program, an exit strategy and relevant activities would be established and implemented within a narrow time frame with 
little room for modification, compared to a longer-term program (Gardner et al., 2005).  
A timeline for an exit should be set in a gradual and flexible manner. A gradual exit allows implementing agencies to 
observe which program components are solidly established, and provide complementary programs as needed (Levinger & 
McLeod, 2002). In addition, a gradual exit of program activities guided by program goals allows lessons learned to be 
applied to subsequent activities, similar programs, or a next strategic planning (Lewis, 2016; Rogers, 2004). Furthermore, 
stakeholders may build experiences in independent operations prior to exit. These experiences can assess their technical, 
managerial and institutional capacity (Rogers, 2004). A degree of flexibility with an exit timeline is also important as 
program components or external circumstances can change during the program funding cycle. The flexibility makes 
unplanned but necessary adjustments more implementable. Additionally, exit timelines with similar programs around the 
program site needs to be considered. In some cases, coordinated exit timelines among relevant programs bring synergistic 
effects to sustain benefits.  
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3.2 Specific Exit Criteria and Benchmarks 
Exit criteria such as achievements of impact targets or progresses made toward sustainable outcomes should be 
established and agreed upon (Rogers, 2004). The principle role of impact indicators is to suggest whether key program 
components are effective and sustainable (Gardner et al., 2005). Good impact indicators for an impact assessment should 
be specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time-bound (World Food Programme, 2005). Thus impact indicators 
are a good proxy to gauge the readiness to exit (Gardner et al., 2005). Yet, the use of impact indicators poses risks. The 
targeted level of impact may be unachievable on the exit timeline, in which case the indicators in turn are indicative of a 
need for an exit timeline modification (Rönngren, 2011; Rogers, 2004). The use of impact indicators for exit could 
disincentivize achievement of program goals. When local stakeholders perceive that reaching a given level of an impact 
target will trigger a withdrawal of program supports, this reduces their motivation to achieve that impact (Rogers, 2004). 
Likewise, if exit is considered abandonment with local stakeholders’ demonstration of competency, their motivation for 
achieving impact targets or strengthening their own capacity is easily undermined (Levinger & McLeod, 2002). This is a 
fundamental challenge with an exit strategy because it punishes motivation and success.  
Benchmarks are the operationalized measurable indicators of the exit criteria, and benchmarks should be linked to 
specific program elements that are to be phased down, over or out. Therefore selection of exit benchmarks needs to be 
based on an analysis of effective aspects of a program and identification of indicators that clearly show the progress 
(Rogers, 2004). Benchmarks can be expressed qualitatively, yet more likely quantitatively with percentage or frequency 
(Gardner et al., 2005). Instead of the term benchmarks, the exit policy of the World Food Program uses the term, trigger to 
describe a benchmark that needs to be achieved before exit. Triggers can be programmatic, contextual, systemic, and 
external indicators (World Food Programme, 2005). Finally, action steps to assess and measure the stated benchmarks 
should be delineated. Accordingly, responsible parties or key individuals have to be identified to take those action steps 
with their roles and responsibilities spelt out (Rogers, 2004). 
3.3 Identifying Key Actors and Their Relationships 
Identifying potential and actual key actors is a conscious choice because they vary in expertise, capacity, geographic 
location, focus and value. For instance, some of them have built sufficient capacity to wield a political influence, and 
disseminate a particular agenda while others not. Some might be highly professional with a strong position at a national 
level whereas others at a developing stage with a local foothold (Rönngren, 2011). Nevertheless, identifying key actors 
and tapping their cooperation set the stage for a successful exit because their clear understanding of program goals likely 
provides necessary supports to realize those goals (Levinger & McLeod, 2002). A program exit, by definition, almost 
always means the end of funding and other resources. But the key actors may plan and assist in mobilizing adequate 
resources to maintain the necessary scope and quality of services for sustained benefit flows after exit (Gardner et al., 
2005). Furthermore, acknowledging the program goals clarifies roles and responsibilities among stakeholders. This 
reduces potential misunderstandings of the exit and exit activities, and future dependency on external supports (Rönngren, 
2011). As important as identifying key actors is figuring out their underlying power dynamics that can play a role to form 
a consortium and advocate one another for exit activities (Gardner et al., 2005).  
Horizontal and vertical linkages are essential to sustain program outcomes and benefits when those linkages are functional 
and strong. Horizontal linkages are networks of similar groups or key individuals, and their regular contacts provide them 
with a source of information, mutual support and assistance. Horizontal linkages potentially offer economies of scale in 
purchases, and keep morale and motivation high. Vertical linkages, on the other hand, are networks with higher-level 
organizations. Local or lower-level actors receive resources from those organizations such as consumable supplies or 
training, administrative assistance including supervision, and legal authorities (Rogers, 2004).   
Quality of a relationship can influence over the quality of exit. Key actors who are disengaged in an exit planning tend to 
find an exit unacceptable or even a crisis (Lewis, 2016). However, key actors who are deeply engaged and well informed 
may contribute to setting a positive tone on exit activities in order not to lose the momentum. This positive tone gathers 
further support for a smoother exit by shifting a negative denial of the exit to a claim for ownership.  
With and after exit, donors and local stakeholders could build a new relationship with new roles, rather than abruptly 
ending their established relationships; donors adopt an advisory role on local organizations and individuals while those 
local actors assume responsibilities to run program activities. Their linkage can ensure that the program outcomes 
continue being beneficial, and do not have detrimental impacts or deteriorate later on (Lewis, 2016).   
In summary, although identifying key actors is a critical step for exit, efforts should be made to foster their linkages for a 
stronger network and partnership with other donors or organizations. This is likely to produce synergistic effects among 
other relevant programs, government agencies, and donors through sharing administrative channels, financial and human 
resources, and innovative ideas.  
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3.4 Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism 
Exit plans should be periodically reviewed to ensure they are feasible, realistic and on-track (Levinger & McLeod, 2002). 
An exit monitoring system provides stakeholders with a degree of flexibility and room to modify exit plans within a 
timeline or funding cycle. When an exit monitoring system can be integrated into the overall program’s monitoring plan, 
it reduces a burden of monitoring efforts and maximizes resources allocated to the monitoring plan for both exit and 
program activities. For instance, when funding for exit monitoring is not sufficiently allocated, the overall program 
monitoring system can help collect data on some exit indicators. This saves scarce resources to operate two separate 
monitoring systems in one program (Gardner et al., 2005). 
There are three overarching measures to evaluate effectiveness of an adopted exit strategy whether; the program impact is 
sustained, expanded or even improved after a program exit; the program activities are continued in the same or modified 
format; and the developed system continues to function effectively (Gardner et al., 2005). Ironically, the success of an 
adopted exit strategy cannot readily be assessed without a post-exit evaluation that is rarely carried out (Rogers, 2004). 
Most of the evaluations tend to be conducted at the end of the program cycle, not returning to the program site some years 
after exit. Post-exit evaluations, if properly conducted, could provide stronger evidence of effectiveness of adopted exit 
strategies, and identify what factors predict long-term sustainability of key program outcomes. Rarity of post-exit 
evaluations is attributable to a program funding cycle that hardly allows for a return after the program funding cycle ends 
(Rogers, 2004). Thus, funding for a systematic post-exit evaluation should be secured to [1] determine effectiveness of an 
exit strategy, [2] identify factors for a successful exit, and [3] draw lessons for future exits with similar programs.  
However, an evaluation challenge arises when an exit strategy is implemented under changing contexts. In such cases, it 
may be practically impossible to separate factors that led to a successful exit from other factors that the changes in 
contexts brought about. For instance, when a recipient government formulates a specific policy that  happens to support 
the program or sector, the sustained program benefits after exit can be partly or entirely attributable to the government 
supports. Or when there is a political upheaval or natural disaster at the program site, it would be irrational to solely blame 
the exit strategy for discontinued benefits.  
4. Discussions and Conclusions 
The guiding principles and elements of an exit strategy can collectively assist in framing an exit strategy. Table  2 
summarizes each element with notable considerations for a program-level exit.  
Table 2. Common elements of a viable exit strategy with central principles and potential challenges  
Element Key consideration Central principle  Potential challenge 
Setting exit 
timeline 
- Types of exit strategy  
- Program funding cycle  
- Operational objectives  
- Key checkpoints on a timeline  
- Exit timeline of similar programs 
nearby 
- Transparency on explaining rationale for 
exit timeline  
- Inclusion for ensuring all stakeholders’ 
participation 
- Flexibility for reflecting local 
stakeholders’ opinions on timeline 
- Drastic change in exit or 
program activities  
- Premature program ending 





- Overarching exit criteria 
- Benchmarks of each criterion 
- Methodology for data collection 
and analysis 
- Predictability with measurable impact 
indicators 
- Transparency for justifying exit criteria 
and benchmarks  
- Flexibility for modifying exit criteria, 
benchmarks and relevant activities 
- Difficulty of data 
collection in timely manner 
or data interpretation  
Identifying  
key actors 
- Key actors’ commitment for 
assuming roles 
- Existing capacity level of key 
actors  
- Power and interest dynamics 
among key actors 
- Transparency with criteria for key actor 
selection 
- Obligation for considering risk and 
opportunity with key actors for assuming 
their roles 
- Difficulty in keeping key 
actors incentivized, 
motivated and satisfied 





- Compatibility of exit monitoring 
with overall program monitoring 
- Regular review of exit  
- Funding for post-exit evaluation 
- Transparency in monitoring and evaluation 
process 
- Flexibility for modification of monitoring 
methods 
- Lack of financial and 
human resources for exit 
monitoring and post-exit 
evaluation 
Planning exit before a program inception and implementing an exit strategy as planned reduce operational challenges and 
likely improve program outcomes (Gardner et al., 2005). This requires integrating an exit strategy with the program 
International Journal of Social Science Studies                                                      Vol. 5, No. 7; 2017 
28 
design, and an exit timeline needs to be established at the earliest possible stages. While challenges such as drastic 
changes in plans, premature program ending, or staff turnover may arise, expecting potential challenges and preparing for 
them should be part of an exit strategy. Exit criteria and their benchmarks are critical as they assess the readiness for exit. 
Those criteria and benchmarks should be measurable and simple to interpret. Although overarching criteria and 
benchmarks should not be subject to change without firm justification, flexibility for their potential modification needs to 
be considered. Depending on the program nature and goals, a degree or needs of local stakeholders’ participation may vary. 
However, they always play a critical role for a successful exit as well as program implementation. Identifying key 
stakeholders is one step towards smooth exit. And effectively linking them is another step to bring out synergies and 
outreach to other potential partners for resources and a possible phase-over. Yet, a difficulty is to incentivize and motivate 
local stakeholders for assisting in exit activities especially when financial resources are limited for economic incentives, 
and training or re-training programs. Additionally, the process to identify and link key stakeholders should be sensitive to 
power dynamics, and social or cultural norms. A social violation of them could cause key stakeholders to opt out or refuse 
to cooperate. A monitoring of exit activities never intends to punish errors, but direct them to the right direction for a 
successful exit. A caveat with an exit evaluation is that exit cannot be truly evaluated until a post-exit evaluation provides 
empirical evidence on that exit. As mentioned, such an evaluation rarely takes place largely due to funding issues after the 
end of the funding cycle or contract. 
Exit needs to be viewed as an achievement, not a failure (Lewis, 2016). When properly done in a gradual, sensitive and 
flexible manner, exit can ensure empowerment of local actors and transform power dynamics to sustain program 
outcomes and benefits.    
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